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Fiqh and Canons: Reflections on Islamic and
Christian Jurisprudence
∗

Mark L. Movsesian

As this very fine conference demonstrates, American law-andreligion scholarship has begun to expand its focus beyond the traditional study of church-state relations to an examination of religious
law itself. Much of the new scholarship is comparative, addressing
1
law’s place in different religious traditions. Yet scholars have neglected one important topic. Although American scholarship has begun to address both Christian and Islamic jurisprudence in a serious
2
way, virtually none of the literature attempts to compare the place of
law in these two world religions.
∗

Frederick A. Whitney Professor of Contract Law, St. John’s University School of
Law. For helpful comments, I thank Abduh An-Na‘im, Robin Charlow, John Coughlin, Marc DeGirolami, Robert Delahunty, Haider Hamoudi, Larry Joseph, John
McGinnis, and the participants in this conference. For research assistance, I thank
Arundhati Satkalmi of the St. John’s Law Library and St. John’s students Amanda
Goun, Jennifer Ismat, and George Tsiatis.
1
See, e.g., RELIGION, LAW AND TRADITION: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN RELIGIOUS LAW
(Andrew Huxley ed., 2002); Harold J. Berman, Comparative Law and Religion, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 739 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); Chaim Saiman, Jesus’ Legal Theory—A Rabbinic Reading, 23 J.L.
& RELIGION 97 (2007); Symposium, Text, Tradition, and Reason in Comparative Perspective, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2006).
2
On Christian jurisprudence, see, for example, CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001); CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008); THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE (John Witte Jr. & Frank
S. Alexander eds., 2006). On Islamic jurisprudence, see, for example, ABDULLAHI
AHMED AN-NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE (2008); Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics
of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789
(2004); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in Liberal Democracies,
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1525 (1996); Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad Booksellers, Basra Carpet Merchants, and the Law of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and the Contemporary Muslim
Experience, 1 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 83 (2008); Ali Khan, The Reopening of
the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 341 (2003); Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, Tradition,
and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67 (2006); Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 695 (2004).
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This Essay begins to compare Islamic and Christian conceptions
of law and suggests some implications for contemporary debates
about religious dispute settlement. One must approach this project
with humility, especially in a short piece. Islam and Christianity are
subtle and complex religions. Each has competing strands; each has
evolved over millennia and expressed itself differently over time.
Moreover, although systematic treatments of Islamic law are begin3
ning to appear in English, much remains available only in languages,
like Arabic, that are unfortunately inaccessible to most American
scholars.
Notwithstanding these complexities, some generalizations are
possible. Both Islam and Christianity spring from faith, but the two
religions express faith differently—and the difference relates to law.
In Islam, a comprehensive body of law sacralizes daily life and con4
nects believers to God. Islam’s primary discourse, fiqh, or “jurispru5
dence,” attempts to derive that law from scriptural sources. Islam’s
clergy, the ulama, or “learned”—often translated as “jurists”—are ex6
perts in that law. In fact, many scholars maintain that nothing exceeds law’s importance in the life of Islam. A generation ago, the
Orientalist Joseph Schacht famously asserted that law constitutes Is7
lam’s “core and kernel”; more recently, Wael Hallaq has written that
“law has been so successfully developed in Islam that it would not be
8
an exaggeration to characterize Islamic culture as a legal culture.”
9
One should not “overlegalize” Islam, which values commitment to
10
God rather than routine rule following. Nonetheless, a comprehensive religious law system, one that guides believers in their daily activities, has been a crucial part of the Muslim experience.
By contrast, Christianity does not express its faith through a
body of law. Christianity’s traditional discourse is theology, a reflec-

3

See, e.g., MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (3d
ed. 2003).
4
See MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 181 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing Sunni
Islam).
5
See F.E. PETERS, ISLAM: A GUIDE FOR JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 174 (2003) (defining
fiqh).
6
Id.; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 129 (“scholar-jurists”).
7
JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964).
8
WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 209 (1997).
9
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI‘AH LAW 1 (2008).
10
See DANIEL BROWN, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 127 (2004); JOHN L.
ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 68 (3d ed. 1998).
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11

tion on God’s nature, not His will. Its clergy are sacramental minis12
ters, not legal scholars. This is not to say that Christianity embraces
antinomianism or lacks interest in ethical behavior. On the contrary,
13
most contemporary churches have some form of canon law, and
14
Christian jurisprudence exists.
But law lacks the significance in
Christianity that it has in Islam. Unlike fiqh, canon law serves an auxiliary function in the life of Christianity; it is facilitative, not constitu15
tive, of the believer’s relationship with God. Unlike fiqh, it has a fairly limited scope. And, unlike fiqh, Christian jurisprudence is not
exegetical. Compared with Islam, as many scholars note, Christianity
focuses more on orthodoxy than orthopraxy, on correct doctrine ra16
ther than correct practice.
The different emphasis that Islam and Christianity place on religious law is reflected in contemporary attitudes toward religious tribunals. In some Western societies, Muslim organizations have called
for Islamic tribunals to resolve family and commercial disputes
among consenting Muslims. According to proponents, such tribunals
are necessary for Muslims in Western societies—so-called “minority”
17
18
Muslims —to “‘live our faith to the best of our ability.’” Not all
“minority” Muslims agree; the proposals have created tensions within
19
Muslim communities as well as with non-Muslims. The fact that
many Muslims believe that their faith requires them to resolve family

11

See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 68.
See PETERS, supra note 5, at 176.
13
For an introduction to contemporary canon law, see Norman Doe, Modern
Church Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 271.
14
For a sourcebook on Christian jurisprudence, see FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS:
A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Oliver O’Donovan & Joan Lockwood O’Donovan eds., 1999).
15
See infra text accompanying notes 145-51.
16
ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 68; RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 354.
17
Cf. TARIQ RAMADAN, RADICAL REFORM 31 (2009) (discussing the “‘minority fiqh’”
that some scholars have formulated for “Muslims living in a ‘minority situation,’ particularly in the West”).
18
Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in
Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573, 585 (2008) (quoting Interview by Rabia
Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Can. Soc’y of Muslims (Aug. 1995), available at
http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm).
19
See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the
Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2010) (arguing against Islamic arbitration). For more on some Muslims’ objections to Islamic
arbitration, see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
12
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and commercial disputes in Islamic tribunals, however, demonstrates
the importance that religious law has in contemporary Muslim life.
By contrast, a desire for religious tribunals does not loom large
for contemporary Christians. True, some Christian organizations offer “Christian arbitration” services, and church tribunals resolve dis20
putes about church structure and discipline. But these phenomena
differ from their Islamic counterparts. Although hard statistics are
unavailable, it does not appear that many Christians wish to resolve
legal questions in religious tribunals; most see civil litigation as an ac21
ceptable dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, even if Christians wished to settle their disputes under religious law, contemporary Christianity does not provide one for them to use. For example,
the current Code of Canon Law of the Catholic Church belies any
notion of a general Christian substantive law. “In respect to most le22
gal matters regulated by civil law,” the Code “says nothing.” Similarly, “Christian arbitration” tends to involve general ethical principles
23
rather than legal doctrine.
To be sure, factors beyond internal religious dynamics also help
explain why contemporary Muslims and Christians value religious law
differently. The Enlightenment has had a secularizing effect on
Western society and made Christianity a more private phenomenon
24
than it once was. Islam may similarly evolve; indeed, some argue
that the transformation already has begun. And the desire of some
Western Muslims for Islamic tribunals may reflect an assertion of
community identity more than religious commitment. I discuss these
factors below. One should not dismiss internal religious dynamics,
however. Comparatively speaking, law figures more prominently in
the life of Islam than Christianity, and this difference surely influences how Muslims and Christians view religious tribunals today.
Before going further, I should clarify the way I use three important terms. By “Islam,” I mean the classical Sunni tradition. Some
20

On Christian arbitration, see Michael C. Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?:
Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 177–78
(2007). For a recent case enforcing a Christian arbitration agreement, see Easterly v.
Heritage Christian Sch., No. 1:08-CV-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 26, 2009).
21
See Thomas J. Paprocki, Methods of Avoiding Trials, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE
CODE OF CANON LAW 1803, 1803–04 (John P. Beal et al. eds., 2000).
22
John M. Huels, Introduction, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW,
supra note 21, at 47, 85.
23
See infra text accompanying notes 189-94.
24
See MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD 57–58 (2007).
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may quarrel with this decision. To focus on classical Sunni Islam is to
exclude other important currents like Shia Islam and Sufi mysticism.
Moreover, some commentators maintain that the classical model is
25
“too theoretical” to justify scholarly emphasis. For example, Haider
Hamoudi cautions that, by focusing on classical Islam, one risks becoming an expert in an abstraction that has little to do with how law
26
actually operates in Muslim countries.
And some contemporary
Muslims are rethinking the classical model and developing new ways
27
of following Islam in the Western world.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, a focus on classical Sunni Islam
seems justified. Roughly ninety percent of contemporary Muslims are
28
Sunni, and classical Sunni Islam remains the overwhelming focus of
29
mainstream Islamic law scholarship. Scholars like Hamoudi may be
correct when they advocate change in Islamic legal scholarship, but,
for an outsider seeking to engage the material, the mainstream position seems a safe place to begin. Moreover, “a substantial number of
Muslims derive, and for the foreseeable future will continue to derive,
their normative understandings of Islam from historical conceptions
30
of Islamic orthodoxy.” Classical Islam thus represents an important
empirical phenomenon that scholars must engage if they wish to understand the background for contemporary Muslim thought.
Like Islam, “Christianity” encompasses different traditions. The
Catholic view of law differs from the Protestant and the Orthodox.
Moreover, Christian traditions have adopted different positions at different times; one cannot reduce millennia of reflection to a single
formula. One must start somewhere, though. When I discuss Christianity, I mean what some scholars call the “great tradition,” defined
by the Bible, the apostolic tradition, and the first ecumenical coun31
cils.
Most mainstream Christians accept the legitimacy of these
25
Mohammad Fadel, Islamic Politics and Secular Politics: Can They Co-Exist?, 25 J.L.
& RELIGION 187, 190 (2009) (discussing this criticism).
26
See Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 83–84.
27
See infra text accompanying notes 198–212.
28
See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM
POPULATION: A REPORT ON THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S MUSLIM
POPULATION 1 (2009), available at http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/
Orphan_Migrated_Content/Muslimpopulation.pdf.
29
See Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 83–84.
30
Fadel, supra note 25, at 190 (stating author’s assumption).
31
See James S. Cutsinger, Introduction: Finding the Center, in RECLAIMING THE GREAT
TRADITION: EVANGELICALS, CATHOLICS & ORTHODOX IN DIALOGUE 7, 7–10 (James S.
Cutsinger ed., 1997); see also J.I. Packer, On from Orr: Cultural Crisis, Rational Realism
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sources, even if they disagree about particulars. As Witte and Alexander observe, “there is more confluence than conflict in Catholic,
Protestant, and Orthodox understandings of law,” particularly if one
32
takes the “long and responsible historical perspective.”
“Law,” too, is a vague term that covers many discrete concepts relevant here, including canon, divine, Islamic, Jewish, and natural law.
I cannot treat these categories in detail, nor, I think, is it necessary to
do so. I will distinguish among them where important to avoid confusion. The key point is this: When I say that Islam values law in a way
Christianity does not, I mean that Islam has thought it vital to develop
a comprehensive legal system to guide believers’ daily lives. Classical
fiqh covers topics most readers would think of as spiritual, like prayer
and fasting, as well as those most readers would think of as temporal,
33
like commerce and inheritance. Apart from medieval Catholicism,
perhaps, Christianity has never had such a system, and no Christian
tradition has one today.
One sort of law that I will not discuss much here is state law. Islam and Christianity both have reflected on state law and the stance
that believers should take toward it. I leave that important and complicated subject for another occasion. My interest here is law in religion, not religion in law. I address how law figures in the relationship
between believers and God, not between believers and the political
authorities.
Finally, I should note that my interest relates to Islam and Christianity as empirical phenomena. They also represent much more
than that. I do not, however, address the religions’ truth claims here,
nor do I attempt to evaluate their respective approaches to law. I attempt instead to offer tentative views on a difference that lurks in the
background of Muslim-Christian interactions, one that already has
contributed to controversy in two Western democracies. Before Muslims and Christians can negotiate this difference, they must understand it. I hope this Essay contributes to that important endeavor and
to the growing body of work in comparative religious law.

& Incarnational Ontology, in RECLAIMING THE GREAT TRADITION: EVANGELICALS,
CATHOLICS & ORTHODOX IN DIALOGUE, supra, at 154, 156–57 (describing content of
“the great tradition of Christian faith and life”).
32
John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander, Introduction to 1 THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 2, at xxi,
xxxv.
33
See KAMALI, supra note 9, at 42.
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* * *
As Tariq Ramadan observes, “[t]he first and most important
34
element of Muslim identity is faith.” The Muslim is one who believes and puts his trust in God, who submits to God’s will, as God has
35
revealed that will in the witness of the Prophet Muhammad. Unlike
Christianity, however, Islam has not attempted to express its faith by
36
reflecting systematically on God’s nature. Islam has focused most of
its intellectual energy on jurisprudence, an attempt to understand
God’s will, not His nature, and to actualize that will in a system of
37
law.
Islam teaches that God revealed His final law for humanity—the
38
Sharia, a word which in Arabic means “way to the watering-place” —
in two sources. The Quran, or “Recitation,” is a collection of roughly
6200 verses (ayat) that Muslims believe God communicated to Muhammad, through the intercession of the angel Gabriel, over a span
39
of roughly two decades beginning in the year 610. The revelations
came during two discrete periods in Muhammad’s life, the first in
Mecca, where he struggled against a largely hostile political and religious establishment, and then in Medina, where he emigrated to
40
form the new Muslim community, or umma. The verses appear in
more than 100 chapters (suras), arranged in terms of length, from
41
longest to shortest. In contrast to Christians, who see the Bible as
divinely inspired, Muslims believe that the Quran is literally the word
42
of God, an inimitable miracle, “perfect, eternal, and unchangeable.”
43
Less than ten percent of the Quran concerns law. Yet, as Hallaq observes, the legal ayat “represent a larger weight than [their]

34

TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM 79 (2004) (emphasis omitted); see also KAMALI, supra note 9, at 5 (“Islam is a faith and a moral code
first and foremost; it stands on its own five pillars, and following a legal code is relative and subsidiary to the original call and message of Islam.”).
35
See RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 108.
36
See RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 11–12 (arguing that Islam does not have a
“‘theology,’” in Christian terms).
37
See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 68–69.
38
KAMALI, supra note 9, at 2.
39
See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 16–17; PETERS, supra note 5, at 99, 101.
40
On Meccan and Medinan suras, see PETERS, supra note 5, at 99. On the founding of the umma in Medina, see id. at 128.
41
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 17.
42
ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 19.
43
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 25.
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44

number may indicate.” Unlike the nonlegal verses, the legal verses
tend not to repeat, and their average length is two or three times that
45
of the nonlegal verses. Thus, while one should not perceive the Quran as a code, its legal elements are quite important. The Quran prescribes rules regarding both worship (ibadat) and “civil transactions”
46
(mu‘amalat). The latter category covers many subjects that contemporary Western readers would think of as secular, like family law, including “marriage, divorce, paternity, custody of children, maintenance, inheritance and bequests”; “commercial transactions, such as
sale, lease, loan, and mortgage”; and “crimes . . . such as murder,
47
highway robbery, theft, adultery, and slanderous accusation.”
The Sharia’s second source is the Sunna, or practices of the
Prophet—his words and deeds, the judgments he rendered, the con48
duct he allowed and the conduct he forbade. The Sunna appears in
“tradition reports,” or hadiths, that recount episodes in the Prophet’s
49
life. Many such reports circulated after Muhammad’s death in 632;
in the ninth and tenth centuries, Muslim scholars sifted and com50
piled them into authoritative versions. Unlike in the Quran, legal
51
materials predominate. Although it binds believers, the Sunna must
be read consistently with the Quran, and, in case of clear conflict, the
52
latter controls.
Because it often speaks in general terms, especially with respect
to mu‘amalat, the Sharia does not always provide believers clear guid53
ance. Fiqh evolved as a way to make the Sharia operational. The systematization “took place in the second and third centuries of Islam,”
54
starting around 750. The ulama derived fiqh through an exegetical

44

WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 21 (2005).
Id.
46
See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 26 (discussing Quranic rules); KAMALI, supra note 9,
at 17 (defining these terms).
47
KAMALI, supra note 9, at 19.
48
See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 80.
49
See id. Scholars often use the terms Sunna and hadith interchangeably. See
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 61–62.
50
ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 80–81.
51
See KNUT VIKØR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 45
(2005).
52
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 79.
53
See KAMALI, supra note 9, at 50.
54
AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 14.
45
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55

process called ijtihad, a word that means “striving or exertion.”
Faced with a situation the Sharia did not expressly cover, the jurists
56
would search for a similar case and determine its “cause,” or ‘illa.
Having done so, they would see whether the ‘illa could extend by
57
analogy—qiyas—to the new case. For someone trained in common
law reasoning, this process is very familiar: one discovers the ratio decendi of a case and determines whether it applies in new circums58
tances.
Ijtihad is quintessentially a religious exercise, a way of relating to
59
the divine. The Legislator, in Islamic legal theory, is God; the jurist
60
simply seeks, as best he can, to infer God’s will from revelation. Islam does not admit the concept of natural law in the Christian
61
sense. Early on, the ulama rejected the idea that human beings
could discern good and evil, and thus the requirements of God’s law,
62
through speculative reason.
That view, associated with a ninthcentury school known as the Mutazalites, seemed to impinge on
63
God’s sovereignty. Mainstream fiqh adopted the position of the Mutazalites’ opponents, the Asharites, who argued that God’s will, not
64
human reason, determines what is good or bad, lawful or unlawful.
Thus, while reason plays an important role in Islamic law, its purpose
remains circumscribed. The jurist who engages in ijtihad does not
65
seek principally the rule that seems to him most beneficial or just.
He does not even attempt to understand the ultimate intent of God,
55

KAMALI, supra note 9, at 162; see also PETERS, supra note 5, at 180–81 (“‘personal
initiative’”).
56
BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 67 (1998).
57
For an excellent discussion of this process, see KAMALI, supra note 3, at 264–
305.
58
See Wael B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic Law and the Common Law: Logic and
Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79, 86 (1985–86).
59
Cf. AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 15 (“The essentially religious nature of Shari‘a
and its focus on regulating the relationship between God and human believers mean
that believers can neither abdicate nor delegate their responsibility [for ijtihad].”).
60
See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 440–41.
61
See RÉMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD 160 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 2007);
RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 149–51.
62
This is not to say that Islam rejects speculative reason entirely. See infra text accompanying note158.
63
See RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 149.
64
See id.; BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 165–67. See generally KAMALI, supra note 3, at
441–45 (discussing three different views that ulama have held regarding reason and
revelation).
65
See WEISS, supra note 56, at 37.
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66

which remains unknowable. Rather, he seeks to discover, through
67
reason, the rule that the Lawgiver has commanded.
The ulama recognized that jurists conducting ijtihad could reach
different conclusions. Over time, though, jurists might be able to
68
reach consensus, or ijma, on a point of fiqh. Once formed, consen69
sus precluded further ijtihad. Indeed, “[b]y the beginning of the
tenth century,” the ulama had concluded that ijma had been reached
70
on all the essential points of fiqh. The “door of ijtihad” had closed;
from then on, jurists were not to derive new rules, but simply “study
71
the established legal manuals and write their commentaries.” To do
otherwise would be to engage in unjustified innovation (bida), an ac72
cusation “equivalent to the charge of heresy in Christianity.” Not all
ulama have agreed, then or now, but “the closing of the door” re73
mains a powerful concept in mainstream Islam.
74
One should not see fiqh as “monolithic,” however. Islam has
had various schools of jurisprudence (madhabs) over the course of its
history, four of which remain today in Sunni Islam: the Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki, and Hanbali madhabs, all named for the jurists who
75
Traditionally, they have dominated in different
founded them.
76
geographical regions. The madhabs disagree on some substantive
and methodological questions, including the correct interpretation
of parts of the Sharia and the proper role of reason, judicial prefe77
rence (istihsan), and public interest (istislah) in legal analysis. In
66

See BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 183-84 (discussing work of Ghazali).
See KAMALI, supra note 3, at 440–41.
68
See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 82–83.
69
See DAVID WAINES, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 83 (2d ed. 2003).
70
KAMALI, supra note 9, at 94.
71
ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 84; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 142–44.
72
ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 84; see also JONATHAN P. BERKEY, THE FORMATION OF
ISLAM: RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN THE NEAR EAST, 600–1800, at 147 (2003) (“To go
against the consensus was, in a very real sense, to step outside the tradition, to become in fact a heretic.”).
73
See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 226–29 (discussing Muslim traditionalism);
KAMALI, supra note 3, at 490 (“With the exception of the Hanbalis, who maintain that
ijtihad in all of its forms remains open, the ulama of the other three schools have on
the whole acceded to the view that independent ijtihad has discontinued.”). For a
recent call for “a second era of ijtihad,” see Khan, supra note 2.
74
KAMALI, supra note 9, at 92.
75
See WAINES, supra note 69, at 65–71; Stilt, supra note 2, at 721.
76
KAMALI, supra note 9, at 73 (contrasting regional distribution of Hanafi and
Maliki madhabs).
77
Id. at 93–94.
67
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principle, though, each Sunni school accepts the others as legitimate,
and Muslims need not adhere exclusively to any madhab. Nowadays,
“[a] Muslim may join any orthodox school he or she wishes, or
78
change from one school to another, without formalities.”
Law has had a more ambivalent place in Christianity. Christianity started as a movement within Judaism; the Gospels record that Je79
sus was a rabbi, a teacher of Jewish law, or Torah.
Very early,
though, in apostolic times, Christianity rejected what it saw as Judaism’s legalism, especially the style of close legal reasoning that characterized the Pharisaic tradition that was becoming Judaism’s domi80
nant expression. The Gospels portray Jesus as denouncing religious
lawyers for focusing on technicalities and neglecting “the weightier
81
matters of the law: justice and mercy and faith.” In particular, Christians rejected what they characterized as ceremonial practices, such as
82
dietary rules and circumcision. The Pauline epistles portray such
83
rules as distracting from the more spiritual worship God desires.
Christianity did not reject law entirely, though. The early Christians drew a distinction between the ceremonial aspects of Torah and
what they perceived as its moral content—the Ten Commandments,
84
for example. The moral law survived; in fact, Paul argued, it was ac85
cessible to human reason as a kind of natural law. Christians taught
that the moral law had achieved perfection in Christ’s example of
piety and sacrifice, in the values He had proclaimed in the Sermon
on the Mount, particularly the Beatitudes (“Blessed are those who
hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled. Blessed
86
are the merciful, for they will receive mercy.”). This is what the ear-

78
Id. at 94; Stilt, supra note 2, at 721 (“Historically, school affiliation among Sunnis was more important than it tends to be today.”).
79
See, e.g., John 1:38; see also Luke Timothy Johnson, Law in Early Christianity, in
CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 53, 57.
80
See Johnson, supra note 79, at 56 (discussing ascendance of Pharisaic Judaism
after 70 A.D.).
81
Matthew 23:23.
82
See Johnson, supra note 79, at 63.
83
See, e.g., Galatians 5:6; Romans 14:1–6.
84
See Johnson, supra note 79, at 63.
85
See Brian Tierney, Natural Law and Natural Rights, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 89, 91 (discussing Romans 2).
86
Matthew 5:6–7; see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1965, at 477
(1994) (“The New Law or the Law of the Gospel is the perfection here on earth of
the divine law, natural and revealed. It is the work of Christ and is expressed particularly in the Sermon on the Mount.”).

MOVSESIAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

872

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/28/2010 2:04 PM

[Vol. 40:861

ly Christians meant when they said that Christ had come to fulfill the
87
88
law, that Christ constituted the law’s end, or telos. Christ had revealed Torah’s inner dimension; if they believed in Him, Christ
would give his followers grace to follow His “new commandment” to
89
“love one another.” “[T]he one who loves another,” Paul wrote,
90
“has fulfilled the law.”
Now, “love one another” does not provide much practical legal
91
guidance. The early Christians recognized this fact but apparently
did not think such guidance important. They believed that the temporal world was quickly passing away; the point was not to achieve justice on earth but to prepare for eternity, which would arrive very
92
soon. Thus, where the Quran announces detailed rules about inhe93
ritance, the Gospels recount that Jesus declined to resolve an inhe94
ritance dispute for one of his followers. Dividing an estate correctly
was not important, but the condition of one’s soul, which God would
soon judge. Paul reprimanded early Christians for bringing lawsuits
against one another, particularly in Roman courts where pagan
judges presided. Christians should resolve disputes among themselves. Indeed, why were Christians demanding their legal rights at
95
all? “Why not rather be wronged?” Paul asked. “Why not rather be
96
defrauded?”
As the apostolic age ended, and Christians realized that they
were not living in the last generation but would need some sort of
temporal arrangements, they started to engage law in a more serious
97
way. Practically, they began to formulate canons—the word comes
87

See Matthew 5:17.
Romans 10:4; see also Johnson, supra note 79, at 63.
89
John 13:34.
90
Romans 13:8.
91
See Johnson, supra note 79, at 63–64.
92
Cf. HANS KÜNG, ISLAM: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 581–83 (John Bowden trans.,
2007) (“The original Christian community . . . lived in expectation of the imminent
return of the Lord . . . and consequently were uninterested in establishing structures
of worldly power.”).
93
THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN 4:11-14, at 186-88 (‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali
trans., 11th ed. 2004).
94
Luke 12:13–15.
95
1 Corinthians 6:7.
96
Id.
97
See Ladislas M. Örsy, Theology and Canon Law, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE
CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 21, at 1, 7 (noting that early Christian assemblies
realized that “they had to create ordered structures and converging operations if
they wanted to exist at all”).
88
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from the Greek for “straight rod’” or “measuring stick”—regarding
98
church structure and discipline. The canons developed episodical99
ly; they tended to be brief and ad hoc. Christians collected them in
informal handbooks like the first century Didache, “which established
rules governing the liturgy, the sacraments and lay practices such as
100
fasting.”
For centuries, various unofficial collections circulated
101
Christians did not regard any of
throughout the Christian world.
these collections as complete or universally applicable; Christians evi102
dently did not think they required such a collection.
Indeed, the
first serious attempt to systematize the canons occurred relatively late,
during the so-called Papal Revolution (1050–1200), roughly one
103
thousand years after Christianity’s founding.
Virtually all Christian traditions have some form of canon law,
104
but they value it differently. Catholicism has been most enthusiastic. Medieval Catholicism, in particular, developed a reticulated canon law system that extended beyond worship and church discipline
to cover social relations. So, for example, there was a medieval canon
law of crimes, contracts, inheritance, property, and torts, all of which
105
derived, in theory, from the church’s authority over the sacraments.
Medieval Catholicism also professionalized the ecclesiastical courts.
These courts had existed since late antiquity; in the fifth century, Augustine had bemoaned the time his judicial tasks took away from his
106
other episcopal responsibilities. But ecclesiastical courts always had
107
The medieval Papacy regularized their
been somewhat informal.

98

HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 199 (1983) (“measuring stick”); Kenneth Pennington, The Growth of Church Law, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY 386, 390 (Augustine Casiday & Frederick W. Norris eds., 2007)
(“straight rod”).
99
See R.H. Helmholz, Western Canon Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 71, 72–73; Johnson, supra note 79, at 64.
100
Pennington, supra note 98, at 387.
101
See R.C. MORTIMER, WESTERN CANON LAW 12–15 (1953).
102
See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 199–200; Helmholz, supra note 99, at 73–74.
103
See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 115–19, 202.
104
See Helmholz, supra note 99, at 72.
105
BERMAN, supra note 98, at 225; John Witte, Jr., Introduction to CHRISTIANITY AND
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 2, at 1, 10–11.
106
See John C. Lamoreaux, Episcopal Courts in Late Antiquity, 3 J. EARLY CHRISTIAN
STUD. 143, 144–46 (1995); Noel E. Lenski, Evidence for the Audientia episcopalis in the
New Letters of Augustine, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND AUTHORITY IN LATE ANTIQUITY 83, 93
(Ralph W. Mathisen ed., 2001).
107
See Helmholz, supra note 99, at 74.
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operation and theorized their jurisdiction as part of a new “constitu108
tional” order of the church.
Other Christian traditions have been less positive about canon
law. Protestants have been the most suspicious. As Witte explains,
the Reformers believed that “medieval Catholic canon law obstructed
the individual’s relationship with God and obscured simple biblical
109
110
norms for right living.”
Luther burned canon law books, and
Protestant countries gradually transferred the jurisdiction of eccle111
siastical authorities to state officials. Protestants did not abolish canon law entirely, however, and most denominations continue to em112
Orthodoxy has canons, but it views them
ploy some form today.
more as “pastoral texts” than “juridical norms,” guides to handling
113
specific spiritual problems, not prescriptions for conduct. It allows
“ample scope” for “economy,” the relaxing of canons in particular
114
cases in order to further a person’s spiritual development. Ortho115
While some
doxy has never produced a universal code of canons.
contemporary Orthodox writers favor codification, others argue that
116
it would contradict Orthodoxy’s mystical essence.
Christianity also has engaged law philosophically, as a matter of
jurisprudence. Over centuries, it has developed subtle and varied typologies of law. The Church Fathers taught that there were three
kinds of law: natural law, accessible to human reason; Mosaic Law,
contained in the Old Testament; and the law of Christ, revealed in
117
the Gospels.
In the ninth century, Nestorian Christians came up
with a slightly different taxonomy: the divine law of Christ, “beyond
reason and nature”; the “law of nature, based on reason, innate in
man’s mind”; and the satanic “law of violence,” which opposed both

108

See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 221–24, 530.
Witte, supra note 105, at 16.
110
Id.; see Helmholz, supra note 99, at 83.
111
See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II, at 6 (2003); Witte, supra note
105, at 16.
112
Cf. Doe, supra note 13, at 271 (mentioning Protestant churches that have canon law).
113
LEWIS J. PATSAVOS, SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE HOLY CANONS 21–22 (2003).
114
Doe, supra note 13, at 285; see PATSAVOS, supra note 113, at 12–13.
115
See Paul Valliere, Introduction to the Modern Orthodox Tradition, in 1 THE
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra
note 2, at 503, 518.
116
See PATSAVOS, supra note 113, at 8–9.
117
See BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 212.
109
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118

God and nature. Christian legal theorists have argued for centuries
about the overlap among the different categories as well as the re119
spective roles of reason and revelation in discovering them.
As with canon law, Christian traditions have valued jurisprudence differently. Western Christianity has been more enthusiastic,
with Catholicism showing the most interest in systematic legal philos120
ophy.
Aquinas provides the best example; with the rise of neoThomism since the nineteenth century, systematic legal thought has
121
experienced a renaissance in Catholic circles.
Protestantism has
viewed jurisprudence somewhat more skeptically, but it has made im122
For example, Melanchthon developed
portant contributions too.
an influential theory of law’s “three uses”—promoting “external . . .
morality,” revealing God’s wrath against sin and sinner, and educat123
ing the faithful —which his contemporary, Calvin, adopted in his
124
More recent Protestant jurisprudential thinkers inown Institutes.
125
clude Barth, Kuyper, and Niebuhr.
Of the three main traditions,
Orthodoxy has had the least interest in systematic jurisprudence, reflecting, perhaps, its suspicion of scholasticism and greater stress on
126
mystical apprehension of divine reality.
Fiqh and canon law are subtle and complex subjects, and space
has allowed only a brief discussion here. This overview, however, allows one to make some observations about the place law has in Islam
118
See Anton Tien, The Apology of Al-Kindi, in THE EARLY CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM
DIALOGUE 381, 449 (N.A. Newman ed., 1993). For more on Nestorian jurisprudence,
see BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 214.
119
See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 2, at 255, 261–62 (contrasting Catholic
and Protestant thought); Tierney, supra note 85, at 91 (noting tensions in Christian
conceptions of natural law).
120
See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 86, §§ 1949–1986, at
473–81.
121
For a good introduction to Aquinas, see ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: THE TREATISE ON
LAW (R.J. Henle ed. & trans., 1993). For a good introduction to neo-Thomism, see
Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN
CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 2, at 3.
122
See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 111, at 6–10 (discussing Lutheran and Calvinist
jurisprudence).
123
FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT,
supra note 14, at 651.
124
See id. at 664.
125
See Mark A. Noll, Introduction to Modern Protestantism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 2, at 261,
282.
126
See Valliere, supra note 115, at 506 (discussing but qualifying this observation).
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and Christianity. First, the historical development of Islamic law differs greatly from the analogous process in Christianity. Recall that
the ulama began to systematize fiqh quite early; the process was basically complete within two or three centuries of the Prophet, when the
127
ulama decided that the “door of ijtihad” had closed.
By contrast,
Christianity existed for one thousand years before any Christians—
and only Christians in the West—thought to assemble the canons in128
to a comprehensive and universally applicable collection. This difference alone suggests how much more important legal system building has been to the Muslim, as opposed to the Christian, religious
experience.
Second, fiqh and canon law have dramatically different scopes.
129
Classical fiqh covers “almost every conceivable arena of social life,”
including how to comport and groom oneself, how to pray, what to
eat, how to conduct business and make contracts, how to buy and sell
real property, whom to marry, how to divorce, and how to divide
130
one’s estate.
Indeed, because fiqh’s scope is so extensive, in the
classical conception, “all” practicing “Muslims need[] . . . at least
131
some rudimentary understanding of it.” Muslims can gain this understanding on their own, but the more typical method is to consult a
member of the ulama for a legal opinion, or fatwa. A fatwa does not
132
bind (or excuse) a believer, but it can be influential, particularly if
the issuing jurist has a reputation for insight and integrity. The ulama
thus function as Islam’s clergy; as in Judaism, religious lawyers are the
133
authorities to whom the community turns for guidance in daily life.
134
Canon law, by contrast, has a much more limited compass. It
deals overwhelmingly with matters of church administration rather
135
As a result, most
than personal behavior and moral judgment.
Christians have comparatively little contact with it in their daily lives.

127

See supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
See supra text accompanying note 103.
129
BERKEY, supra note 72, at 143.
130
See, e.g., id. (discussing topics covered by classical fiqh); KAMALI, supra note 9
(same).
131
BERKEY, supra note 72, at 143. Some contemporary Muslim scholars argue that
much of classical fiqh should be rethought. See infra text accompanying notes 198–
212.
132
See AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 16.
133
See PETERS, supra note 5, at 176–77.
134
See BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 145.
135
See JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 4 (rev. ed. 2004).
128
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As I have explained, medieval Catholicism apparently did have a
136
One should not exaggerate,
comprehensive body of canon law.
however, the degree to which medieval system building represents
137
something central in Christian thought.
Even at the time, important voices protested. Around 1150, for example, Bernard of Clairvaux warned Pope Eugenius not to pay attention to the lawsuits clog138
ging the papal courts.
“[I]t is unworthy for you to be involved in
such affairs,” he wrote, “since you are occupied by more important”—
139
And, as I have explained, Protestant
that is, spiritual—“matters.”
and Orthodox Christians never shared medieval Catholicism’s enthusiasm for canon law.
Moreover, notwithstanding the medieval situation, contemporary Catholicism shows little interest in legal system building. The
current Code of Canon Law, adopted in 1983, eschews any notion of
a general Christian substantive law. The largest sections deal with
questions of worship and discipline, such as the ordination and rank
140
of clergy and the reception of sacraments. “In respect to most legal
141
matters regulated by civil law,” the current Code “says nothing.”
Indeed, the Code frequently adopts civil law by reference in a process
142
called canonization.
As long as civil law doctrines do not violate
principles of “divine law”—the law drawn directly from revelation or
natural law—the Code typically defers to them in areas like contracts,
143
employment, inheritance, and torts.
Augustine would be pleased:
Church trials nowadays are reserved “almost exclusively for marriage
annulment cases,” Christians having decided that Paul’s admonition
144
against secular litigation no longer applies.
Third, the functions of classical fiqh and canon law differ greatly.
Fiqh operates as a crucial link between Muslims and God. Recall that
136

See supra text accompanying notes 105–108.
Cf. Helmholz, supra note 99, at 71–72 (discussing continuing controversy over
canon law in Christian history).
138
FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT,
supra note 14, at 269.
139
Id. at 270–71; see also BERMAN, supra note 98, at 196 (discussing Bernard’s views
regarding the papal courts).
140
CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 42.
141
Huels, supra note 22, at 85.
142
See 1983 CODE c.22 (Canon Law) (“Civil laws to which the law of the Church
defers should be observed in canon law with the same effects, insofar as they are not
contrary to divine law and unless it is provided otherwise in canon law.”).
143
On the definition of “divine law,” see CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 36.
144
Paprocki, supra note 21, at 1803; see CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 194.
137
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the goal of classical ijtihad is to ascertain the will of the Legislator,
145
that is, God. The ulama reason out what God has ordained; in the
146
final analysis, believers comply because God commands it.
Canon
law, by contrast, has an auxiliary function. In John Coughlin’s
147
phrase, canon law “point[s] beyond itself”; it works indirectly, by
148
supporting other aspects of Christian life. For example, by creating
an orderly internal structure, canon law allows the church to adminis149
ter the sacraments and accomplish its evangelical mission. Similar150
ly, canon law educates believers and aids their spiritual growth. In
short, canon law is facilitative, not constitutive, of the believer’s rela151
tionship with God. Canon law honors God, but it does not respond, the way fiqh does, to a divine command.
Fourth, canon law has a contingent quality that classical fiqh
lacks. Because canon law exists to help the church on earth to
achieve its mission, and because the church on earth remains subject
to time and circumstance, canon law must have the capacity to
152
adapt. This does not mean that canon law is entirely malleable; the
belief that divine law does not change places a limit on canon law’s
153
elasticity. “The vast majority of canons” do not embody divine law,
154
however, and can evolve. For example, rules on clerical celibacy in
the Catholic Church have varied from time to time and place to
place. Before the medieval Papal Revolution, parish priests in the
155
Latin rite could marry; afterwards, they could not. In Eastern rites,
156
parish priests may still marry. This capacity for change distinguish145

See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
See supra text accompanying notes 59–67.
147
John J. Coughlin, Canon Law and the Human Person, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 47
(2003).
148
See CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 5–6 (describing functions of canon law).
149
See Örsy, supra note 97, at 2–3.
150
See PATSAVOS, supra note 113, at 4–5, 21; Doe, supra note 13, at 281.
151
See Örsy, supra note 97, at 3 (“When the people intelligently and freely give
themselves to [Christ’s] Church and observe its laws, they honor him.”).
152
See id. at 2; cf. BERMAN, supra note 98, at 202–03 (discussing Western canon
law’s understanding of law as evolving).
153
See Huels, supra note 22, at 56 (“Divine laws, given by God, are unchangeable
by human beings.”). Canons that seek to embody divine law may be somewhat contingent, however. Örsy, supra note 97, at 2.
154
CORIDEN, supra note 135, at 36.
155
See BERMAN, supra note 98, at 95. For the current rule on clerical celibacy, see
1983 CODE c.277 § 1 (Canon Law).
156
See John E. Lynch, The Obligations and Rights of Clerics, in NEW COMMENTARY ON
THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 21, at 343, 356 n.68.
146
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es canon law from fiqh, which—in the classical conception, at least—
achieved perfection many centuries ago and cannot develop further.
Finally, Islamic and Christian jurisprudence differ in basic orientation. Fiqh is an exegetical exercise, an attempt to deduce concrete
157
It generally does not concern itself
rules from scriptural sources.
with defining the nature of justice or the human responsibility for
moral reasoning. Islam does not lack interest in such questions, but
it has tended to channel them to a different discipline called kalam,
158
or “discourse,” a fascinating subject I lack space to address. Christian jurisprudence, by contrast, is not exegetical. It is a kind of speculative legal philosophy, addressing the interplay between reason
and faith and the capacity to apprehend the moral law without spe159
cial revelation. Christianity’s interest in speculative legal reasoning
160
The Pauline epistles,
dates from the religion’s formative period.
the earliest Christian scriptures, themselves speak of natural law, a set
of moral principles “written on [the] hearts” of all people, even
161
“Gentiles.” Historian Patricia Crone nicely captures the distinction
between the Islamic and Christian approaches in discussing how the
two religions would address the use of religious images, or icons.
“[I]n the legal culture of Islam,” she writes, the question would be,
162
“‘when precisely are images permitted?’” In the more “philosophical culture of Christianity,” by contrast, the question would be, “‘what
163
precisely is the nature of an image?’”
* * *
The different emphasis on religious law is reflected in contemporary Muslim and Christian attitudes toward religious tribunals. In
countries where they constitute minority communities, some influential Muslim organizations have sought to establish Islamic law tribunals to resolve family and commercial disputes among consenting Mus157

Cf. BRAGUE, supra note 61, at 145 (noting that canon law “does not put into operation an exegetical method comparable to” Islamic law).
158
See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 69; WEISS, supra note 56, at 25–30. For an argument that kalam represents the most important discipline in Islam, see Mohammad
Fadel, The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public
Reason in Islamic Law, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5, 31 (2008).
159
See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 119, at 261–62.
160
See Tierney, supra note 85, at 89–91.
161
Romans 2:14–15.
162
Patricia Crone, Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm, 2 JERUSALEM
STUDIES IN ARABIC AND ISLAM 59, 83 (1980).
163
Id.
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lims. These organizations contend that Muslims require such tribunals, whose rulings would bind parties in civil courts, in order to practice their faith. Two recent controversies, one in Canada and the
other in Great Britain, illustrate the phenomenon.
In 2003, the Canadian Society of Muslims announced its intention to establish a Muslim Court of Arbitration in Ontario to resolve
164
family disputes. The Society planned to operate the tribunal under
Ontario’s Arbitration Act, which allows binding family-law arbitra165
tion. The tribunal was to resolve only those disputes that Muslims
voluntarily referred to it and decide cases according to “Muslim Per166
sonal/Family Law.”
Such a tribunal was necessary, the Society explained, because Canadian Muslims “live in a non-Muslim country
which subjects us to laws which, for the most part, do not allow us to
167
live our faith to the best of our ability.”
News of the tribunal sparked immediate resistance, with most
opponents expressing concern about the potential oppression of
168
women.
The outcry did not diminish when a government report
recommended allowing Islamic family law arbitration, with some sa169
feguards. The report explained that religious organizations, including at least one Muslim group, had been conducting dispute settle170
ment in Canada for years, thereby helping “people of faith . . . to
171
In response to the outcry, Onlive . . . according to their beliefs.”
172
tario’s Premier announced a ban on all religious arbitration, but
the province eventually took a more nuanced position. As of 2007,
164

See Caryn Litt Wolfe, Note, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of
Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
427, 448 (2006). For the Institute’s Web site, see The Islamic Institute of Civil Justice—the
Muslim
Court
of
Arbitration,
http://muslim-canada.org/
DARLQADAMSHAH1.html (last visited May 19, 2010).
165
See Shachar, supra note 18, at 577.
166
See Interview by Rabia Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Can. Soc’y of
Muslims (Aug. 1995), available at http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm.
167
Id.
168
See MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE,
PROMOTING
INCLUSION
48,
52
(2004),
available
at
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf;
see also Wolfe, supra note 164, at 448–49 (discussing this concern).
169
BOYD, supra note 168, at 133. For example, the report recommended numerous steps to ensure that people’s consent to religious arbitration was informed and
voluntary. Id. at 133–42.
170
Id. at 55–60.
171
Id. at 63 (discussing submissions from advocates of religious arbitration).
172
Wolfe, supra note 164, at 449.
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Ontario had decided to allow religious organizations to arbitrate fam173
ily disputes, but only under secular law.
The British controversy began in 2008, when the Archbishop of
Canterbury, Rowan Williams, gave an address in which he advocated
174
a formal role for Islamic tribunals. In a pluralistic society, Williams
argued, a supplementary role for voluntary Islamic arbitration, par175
ticularly in family and commercial disputes, seemed unavoidable.
Otherwise, a “secular legal monopoly” would overwhelm citizens’ re176
ligious commitments.
Williams emphasized that Islamic tribunals
could not be allowed to deny Muslim citizens their civil rights and
pointed out that Christian and Jewish tribunals traditionally had
shared jurisdiction with civil courts in Britain without creating dire
177
178
consequences.
Critics excoriated Williams, but the Lord Chief
179
Justice endorsed his position.
By autumn 2008, reports surfaced
that the government was advising Muslim groups that civil courts
could enforce Islamic arbitration awards under the English Arbitra180
tion Act.
One such organization, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT),
would like to test the government’s theory. MAT runs Islamic tribun-

173

Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 469 & n.91
(2009).
174
Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Foundation Lecture at the Royal
Courts of Justice: Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575).
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
See id.; see also Interview by Christopher Landau, BBC World at One, with Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury (Feb. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1573 (discussing Orthodox Jewish tribunals).
178
One newspaper characterized the reaction to Williams’s speech as “the most
serious threat to the authority of his office since he became Archbishop.” Ruth
Gledhill & Joanna Sugden, Archbishop of Canterbury ‘Should Resign’ over Sharia Row,
TIMES ONLINE (London), Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/
article3335026.ece.
179
Lord Phillips, Lord Chief Justice of Eng. & Wales, Equality Before the Law 8–9
(July 3, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.matribunal.com/downloads/
LCJ_speech.pdf).
180
See Abul Taher, Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 14, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/
crime/article4749183.ece; cf. David G. Green, Introduction to DENIS MACEOIN, SHARIA
LAW OR ‘ONE LAW FOR ALL?’ 1, 3-4 (2009) (discussing assertion by British Government minister that “sharia rulings on family matters . . . could be given the authority
of a British court”).
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181

als in London, Birmingham, and Manchester.
Although informal
Islamic arbitration has existed in Britain for decades, the organization’s Web site proclaims that it “will . . . for the first time, offer the
Muslim community a real and true opportunity to settle disputes in
accordance with Islamic Sacred Law with the knowledge that the out182
come as determined by MAT will be binding and enforceable.”
MAT advertises its services primarily in family disputes, but it also
183
handles commercial, debt, inheritance, and mosque disputes. MAT
acknowledges that civil law binds citizens but states that Islamic law
also “[has] its place in this society” as “our personal and religious
184
law.” “What a great achievement it will be,” its Web site proclaims,
“if we can produce a result to the satisfaction of both English and Is185
lamic law!”
Some Canadian and British Muslims have vociferously opposed
186
the creation of these Islamic arbitration regimes. And it is true that
the tribunals would cover only certain aspects of fiqh—primarily family and commercial law—not its entirety. Still, the apparent level of
support for Islamic arbitration contrasts dramatically with the lack of
interest contemporary Christianity shows in religious law and tribunals. Recall that ecclesiastical courts tend to be reserved nowadays for
187
internal church matters and, in some cases, marriage annulments.
The vast majority of Christians would never think to use them for lay
188
legal disputes.
Moreover, although some Christian organizations

181

See Green, supra note 180, at 2–3. For the organization’s Web site, see Muslim
Arbitration Tribunal, http://www.matribunal.com/ (last visited May 19, 2010).
182
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, supra note 181.
183
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, Our Cases, http://www.matribunal.com/
cases.html.
184
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, Values and Equalities of MAT,
http://www.matribunal.com/values.html.
185
Id.
186
On Canadian Muslim opposition, see Jehan Aslam, Note, Judicial Oversight of
Islamic Family Law Arbitration in Ontario: Ensuring Meaningful Consent and Promoting
Multicultural Citizenship, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 841, 842 (2006); Wolfe, supra
note 164, at 449. On British Muslim opposition, see Sameer Ahmed, Recent Developments: Pluralism in British Islamic Reasoning: The Problem with Recognizing Islamic Law in
the United Kingdom, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 491, 491, 495–96 (2008). For a recent critique
of Islamic arbitration from a Muslim perspective, see An-Na‘im, supra note 19, at 27–
28.
187
See supra text accompanying note 144.
188
Cf. Paprocki, supra note 21, at 1804 (explaining that “most Christians today are
more likely to sue a fellow Christian in civil court . . . than to bring an action . . . in a
[church] tribunal”).

MOVSESIAN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FIQH AND CANONS

6/28/2010 2:04 PM

883

do offer arbitration services, “Christian arbitration” entails a search
for ethical resolutions to legal disputes, not an application of Christian law.
Peacemaker Ministries, a prominent Christian dispute189
settlement organization, offers a good illustration.
The group was
established “in 1982 by a group of pastors, lawyers, and business
people who wanted to encourage and assist Christians to respond to
190
conflict biblically.”
In addition to informal dispute-settlement mechanisms like mediation, the group offers arbitration through its “In191
stitute for Christian Conciliation.” The Institute’s rules make clear
that arbitrators do not resolve disputes according to some sort of
Christian law. Rather, arbitrators apply secular law, subject to broad
biblical principles like keeping one’s word and acting justly and mer192
cifully. The rules also state that “arbitrators may grant any remedy
or relief that they deem scriptural, just and equitable, and within the
193
scope of the agreement of the parties.” In essence, the service that
Peacemaker Ministries provides resembles what commercial arbitrators know as “ex aequo et bono” decision making—the resolution of
legal disputes according to the broad equitable discretion of the arbi194
trator rather than formal legal analysis.
I recognize that factors beyond internal religious dynamics may
help explain why contemporary Muslims and Christians place a different value on religious tribunals. For decades, sociologists have discussed the “secularization theory,” which holds that modernity leads
195
inexorably to a decrease in religious commitment.
Perhaps this
theory explains the contemporary lack of interest in Christian law.
189

See Grossman, supra note 20, at 177–78 (describing Peacemaker Ministries).
Peacemaker
Ministries,
First
Visit?
Please
Read
This,
http://www.peacemaker.net/site/c.aqKFLTOBIpH/b.937085/k.A1EB/First_Visit_Pl
ease_Read_This.htm (last visited May 19, 2010).
191
Grossman, supra note 20, at 178.
192
See Peacemaker Ministries, FAQ’s Regarding Christian Conciliation: An Introduction
to
Christian
Conciliation,
http://www.peacemaker.net/site/
c.aqKFLTOBIpH/b.3910013/k.93FC/FAQs_Regarding_Christian_Conciliation.htm
(last visited May 19, 2010).
193
See The Inst. for Christian Conciliation, Rules of Procedure,
http://www.peacemaker.net/site/c.nuIWL7MOJtE/b.5378801/k.D71A/Rules_of_Pr
ocedure.htm (Rule 40(B)) (last visited June 21, 2010).
194
See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 43, 127–28 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing equitable arbitration).
195
See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Secularization, Legal Indeterminacy, and Habermas’s
Discourse Theory of Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 73, 79–80 (2007).
190
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That Christians today do not wish to settle disputes according to religious law may reflect more a decline in religious intensity than law’s
196
place in Christianity.
Islam today is approximately the same age
Christianity was at the time of the Renaissance. Perhaps Muslims’ religious intensity will also decrease over time, and Muslims come to see
fiqh as less important to their daily lives. Indeed, advances in scientific knowledge and technology since the Western Enlightenment
197
might accelerate the secularization process. Voltaire had to rely on
the printing press; his successors can use the Internet.
Secularization may already have begun. The fact that proposals
for religious tribunals relate only to some areas, not the whole of fiqh,
suggests that even those Muslims who desire Islamic law do not desire
it in its entirety. Moreover, some contemporary Muslim thinkers
question the relevance of the classical, law-based model for Western
Muslims. Many of these thinkers reject the “closing of the door” and
198
seek to open a new era of ijtihad. For example, Tariq Ramadan ar199
gues that Islam represents a faith, not a culture or civilization. He
maintains that Islam requires Western Muslims to participate wholeheartedly in the social and political life of their countries, to be good
200
citizens who “submit to the body of positive law,” as long as that law
201
does not violate Islamic conscience. Ramadan thinks that conflicts
202
will be “limited.” On a true interpretation of Islam, he argues, one
that avoids the “distorting prism” of the conventional model, Western
203
laws should not pose major barriers to Muslim life.
In most situations, jurists should be able to find solutions to allow Muslims to prac204
tice their faith and abide by secular law.
Khaled Abou El Fadl likewise rejects as “Orientalist” and “essentialist” the notion that Islam and Islamic law are “one and the
196
Cf. Witte & Alexander, supra note 32, at xxxiv (observing that “the legal structure and sophistication of the modern Christian church as a whole is a pale shadow
of what went on before”).
197
See John O. McGinnis, The Symbiosis of Constitutionalism and Technology, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 12 (2001) (observing that “[s]cientific discovery and technological progress seem to have been generally correlated with a decline in religious
faith”).
198
See, e.g., AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2, at 15; Khan, supra note 2, at 343.
199
See RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 79, 214.
200
Id. at 95.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 100; see also id. at 95 (“very rare”).
203
Id. at 100.
204
See id. at 100–01.
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205

same.” Although many observers believe that Muslims must comply
with the totality of Islamic law wherever they are—a belief that would
make life in a non-Muslim country practically impossible—not all
206
Muslim jurists agree.
Muslims must have the ability to practice Islam, but that does not necessarily mean following classical fiqh in
every context. For example, Abou El Fadl points out, the twentiethcentury Egyptian jurist Rashid Rida maintained that Muslims in a
non-Muslim country need follow “only . . . the laws pertaining to acts
207
of worship (‘ibadat) such as fasting, almsgiving, and praying.”
In
other areas, like commercial and criminal law, Muslims could follow
208
the secular laws of the host country.
Finally, Abdullahi An-Na‘im argues that Islamic law should never
be enforced by the state, either in those countries where Muslims
make up a majority of the population or in those countries where
209
Muslims form minority communities. For him, Islamic law must be
a matter of voluntary compliance on the part of the believer. “Islamic
law is always relevant and binding on Muslims,” he writes, “but only as
each Muslim believes it to be and not as declared and coercively en210
forced by the state.”
In the minority-Muslim context, this means
211
that Muslims must avoid involving the state in Islamic arbitration. If
the state enforces Islamic arbitral awards, he believes, that will inevitably corrupt fiqh; “the outcome will always be state law on its own
212
terms.” State enforcement creates the risk that Muslims will comply
with rulings, not out of honest religious conviction, but because civil
courts have ordered them to do so.
It is hard for an outsider to evaluate this debate within Islam.
213
Notwithstanding some signs of an “Islamic Reformation,” though,
205

Khaled Abou El Fadl, Striking a Balance: Islamic Legal Discourse on Muslim Minorities, in MUSLIMS ON THE AMERICANIZATION PATH? 47, 60–61 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad
& John L. Esposito eds., 2000).
206
See id. at 57; Khaled Abou El Fadl, Legal Debates on Muslim Minorities: Between Rejection and Accommodation, 22 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 127, 151–53 (1994) (discussing diversity of opinion among pre-modern and contemporary jurists).
207
Abou El Fadl, supra note 205, at 54.
208
Id.
209
An-Na‘im, supra note 19, at 2. For An-Na‘im’s more extensive development of
his position, see AN-NA‘IM, supra note 2.
210
An-Na‘im, supra note 19, at 3.
211
See id. at 26–28.
212
Id. at 27.
213
The phrase is An-Na‘im’s. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN- NA‘IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC
REFORMATION (1990).
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one should resist assuming that modernity will inevitably change Islam. Observers have begun to question the power of the secularization theory generally; despite the confident forecasts of a generation
214
or two ago, religion does not seem to be in terminal, global decline.
With respect to minority-Muslim communities, specifically, traditional
expressions disproportionately attract younger, Western-born Muslims with university degrees and a familiarity with contemporary culture—the very people to whom, presumably, secularism would appeal
215
most. Although progressive Islamic scholarship is important, it often encounters resistance in Muslim communities. Ramadan, for example, concedes that his ideas “are frightening and . . . appear new
216
and ‘offensive’” to many Muslims; the title of his most recent work,
217
Radical Reform, suggests the degree of change he believes necessary.
An-Na‘im writes that his views “are not only controversial, but also
psychologically and intellectually difficult for the vast majority of
218
Muslims to accept today.”
Another factor that may explain Western Muslims’ interest in religious tribunals is Muslims’ status as a minority community. Muslims
219
have only recently begun to arrive in significant numbers; like most
220
immigrants, many of them find comfort in traditional ways. Moreover, Muslims may find aspects of Western law and courts to be alien
and unfamiliar, the reflections of a different religious history and
221
sensibility.
As the dominant religious group in Western society,
Christians fail to perceive the ways in which their worldview pervades
the judicial system; values that appear neutral and unremarkable to
222
Christians may not seem so to Muslims.
Finally, Western Muslims

214
See, e.g., Thomas F. Farr & William L. Saunders, Jr., The Bush Administration and
America’s International Religious Freedom Policy, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 967–68
(2009).
215
See CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE:
IMMIGRATION, ISLAM, AND THE WEST 156–58, 234 (2009).
216
RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 5.
217
RAMADAN, supra note 17.
218
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Religion, the State, and Constitutionalism in Islamic
and Comparative Perspectives, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 829, 843 (2009).
219
See RUTHVEN, supra note 4, at 353 (discussing Muslim migration to the West in
recent decades).
220
See BOYD, supra note 168, at 46.
221
Cf. RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 99 (noting that “[t]he laws of Western countries
have been thought out and elaborated for a society from which Muslims were absent”).
222
See BOYD, supra note 168, at 46.
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who experience social prejudice may seek solidarity in an expression
223
of group difference. In short, the fact that many Western Muslims
propose Islamic tribunals may reflect an assertion of communal identity more than the centrality of law in the Islamic tradition.
Christians often do fail to perceive the ways in which their values
continue to influence Western law, even considering the major secu224
larizing impact of the Enlightenment. Even so, the argument that
one should see proposals for Islamic tribunals as reflecting communal identity rather than religious conviction misses the point. Of
course Muslims who advocate Islamic tribunals are asserting their
identity. Religious conviction and communal identity often intertwine; identity is how religious conviction expresses itself in human
communities. The key point is that many Muslims express their identity through a demand for law. Other similarly situated groups do
not. Increasing numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs also have
immigrated to Western countries in recent decades, yet no compara225
ble movement for Buddhist, Hindu, or Sikh tribunals has emerged.
So far, these communities have been content to rely on Western legal
institutions even though those institutions have Christian antecedents, and presumably express some Christian values, that the communities do not share.
* * *
This Essay represents a beginning. Much comparative work on
Islamic and Christian jurisprudence remains to be done. For example, what impact, if any, has each religion had on the other’s understanding of law? How have Islamic and Christian jurisprudence influenced the ways that Muslims and Christians conceive the state and
its proper relationship to believers? What implications do Muslim
and Christian theories have for contemporary concepts of religious
freedom and other human rights? These questions will have to await
another day. For now, I hope that I have shed some light on the
complex and different ways that Muslims and Christians understand

223

Cf. RAMADAN, supra note 34, at 6–7 (alleging that Western Muslims live with social “Islamophobia” on a daily basis).
224
See Witte, supra note 105, at 28–30 (discussing Christianity’s impact on current
law).
225
But cf. John Witte, Jr., Exploring the Frontiers of Law, Religion, and Family Life, 58
EMORY L.J. 87, 93 (2008) (observing that “Muslims, Hindus, and other religious minorities are now pressing for equal treatment for their systems of religious arbitration
of marriage and family disputes”).
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law, and how these complexities and differences inform an important
contemporary debate.

